CHAPTER 4

Security Dynamics: Multilayered Security Governance in an Age of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Resilience

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Takeaways for Leading Change

Claims of increasing complexity and nonlinear change in contemporary societies and global politics are often presented as a justification for increasing demands of resilience as a key strategic response in security policy and practices. Our conceptual analysis juxtaposes resilience as a security mentality with other – partly overlapping – security mentalities such as defence, protection, and prevention. This provides a good case study of how perceived complexity of our societies affects the way in which governance and leadership are understood. The theory of nodal security governance resonates with the idea of relational leadership. Our analysis suggests the rise of resilience as a mentality might also indicate a certain lack or even crisis of leadership. The chapter invites readers to exercise a normative and ethical reflection on the practical effects of different security mentalities from the level of individuals to the level of global governance. It also gives readers a basic account of what security is, what it means to govern through security, and what the purpose of security is in relation to sovereignty, political order, and the freedoms and responsibilities of citizens.
How should security be governed? What are the requirements for security leadership today? These questions are being voiced with increasing urgency as a variety of new threats to security emerge and are recognised. There is a growing awareness that the promotion of security as both an objective and subjective condition will require new ways of thinking and acting (Wood & Shearing, 2007). In the past decade, security studies in many disciplines, notably in international relations, political science, governance studies, and criminology, have addressed this challenge.

The governance of security is based on policies and strategies which involve responding to threats or breaches of security that have already occurred. It also involves anticipating and seeking to prevent threats that might occur. The analysis of security governance explores ways of thinking (mentalties) underlying these strategies, the organisational forms used to implement those ways of thinking (institutions such as the police, military, and international organisations), the techniques used to turn mentalities into action (technologies, policies, and strategies), and the resulting actions (practices).

In this chapter, we use the nodal theory of networked and multilayered security governance (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) as the framework through which we analyse responses to the changing security environment and increasing complexity of threats and risks. The perspective of multilayered security governance focuses on the dynamics, contemporary policies, and practices of security. It also provides perspectives on the societal implications of different ways of understanding security governance.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse resilience politics as an example of a novel security mentality. As to the question of social complexity, we argue the growing influence of resilience approaches in relation to security policy and governance.
What is Security?

In political science, security is defined as the core function of the state. The most familiar definition can be found in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan; Hobbes (1651/1999, p. 123) argued that without the state, society would descend into a war of all against all (i.e. a state of nature). It was in order to avoid this that men came together to make a social contract, building a state to provide security. Therefore, the state has been given the power over people and territory. This exceptional power derives from the definition of the state: “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1946/1991, p. 78. Emphasis in original). To sustain their external security, states have military forces and intelligence authorities. To sustain internal security (political, social, and public order), states have police forces and criminal justice systems.
Security is commonly defined as a state of being. This is illustrated in the following definition, published in the *SAGE Dictionary of Criminology*, which is free of discipline-based connotations:

Security is the state of being secure, specifically freedom from fear, danger, risk, care, poverty or anxiety. Security also implies certainty. The roots of the term are in the Latin securitas/secures, derived from se (meaning without) cura (fear, anxiety, pains, worry). Safety is closely related to security. Safety also means freedom from danger or risk. However, it has additional connotations which have more to do with physical conditions, e.g. freedom from injury, the safety of the body and of property. In this context certainty refers to certainty of order, assurance and predictability (Virta, 2006, p. 371; Virta, 2013b, p. 312).

When defined as the core function of the state and, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), as a core human right, security is a powerful political concept and phenomenon. In this reading, the sovereign (state) has the power or position to define the governance, political use, content, objectives, distribution, etc. of security. Fundamental questions of democracy are ambiguous in this context. Governance of security – as a concept – refers to organisations, strategies, and practices. Governance through security is always a political act. There is an irrevocable link between security and the maintenance of sovereignty. The question of who has the power or legitimacy to make claims on matters of (national) security is fundamentally a political one. When a specific phenomenon is authoritatively labelled a security issue – that is, a threat to the existing social order – it is more easily perceived as an issue to be dealt with using exceptional measures. The normal running of politics and governance does not typically rely on such exceptional measures (Huysmans, 2004). What we have presented here is a constructivist perspective of security, which starts from the premise that threats perceived by the state elite or the society in general are not just “out there” in the objective reality to be “picked up”. Instead, political leadership and other authorities are involved in processes of signification that construct and give meaning to these threats. This also affects perceptions of what security is and what it means for the polity in the first place (see also Vuori, 2017).
The vast political capital vested in the term “security” means that any policy pursued in its name is difficult to argue with: How could anyone reasonably be opposed to security (Zedner, 2009, p. 144)? Although contemporary security leadership necessitates an understanding of the complexity of different societal threats and risks, one should not forget that claims for security are essentially contested. In other words, although security is a rather common concept, its use is not clearly definable. It can refer to various objects, processes, and societal contexts depending on one’s perspective and values (Buzan, 1983, p. 6; see also Gallie, 1956, p. 168).

Security can be seen as a fundamentally “wicked problem”, as a “particularly complex and tricky leadership and management context” (see the introductory chapter of this book). This also means that security cannot be “solved” for good, either in existential terms – meaning that there is no absolute state of security available in human life – or in the sense that different stakeholders would achieve a consensus over the value, meaning, and practical efficacy of different security mentalities.

Governing Security Through Resilience

In recent years, scholars in various academic fields have noted that resilience politics is challenging traditional ways of thinking about the governance of security, such as the mentalities of defence, protection, and prevention (Chandler, 2017; Corry, 2014; Virta, 2013a). We argue a security mentality based on resilience is emerging and transforming the ways in which governance and governability are perceived. Instead of focusing on the governance and prevention of foreseeable uncertainties and threats, resilience politics is presented as an answer to the assumed inability of our societies and governments to guarantee security with preventive and proactive policies. This is thought to happen because of the increasingly complex and interconnected nature of our societies and new threats emanating from both man-made and natural sources (Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2014).

As a concept, resilience has a distinctive academic background in life sciences such as systems ecology as well as psychology and complexity thinking dating back to the 1950s (see Bourbeau, 2018). From these
academic fields, resilience thinking has, over the last two decades, slowly transformed into a concept with policy relevance for many societies and international organisations. In contemporary security politics, resilience is used as a strategic principle or objective of various policy fields and issues such as planet politics and climate change, governance of increasing urbanisation, counterterrorism, criminology, and social work.

Resilience politics also has its critics. Scholars have paid attention to the “dark side of resilience” (Schmidt, 2015); this refers to the tendency to prioritise reactive preparedness instead of increasing security through prevention, anticipation, and foresight. They have warned about the unintended negative consequences of the increasing responsibilisation of vulnerable communities and local actors as the subjects of their own fate and security. Resilience politics has also been associated with the process of neoliberalisation and austerity politics; trends that can also be challenges to security governance and leadership models (Joseph, 2013).

Finally, critics of resilience politics have also noted some resilience approaches seem to treat crises almost as desirable experiences local groups can use as valuable lessons to (re)build cohesion and the adaptive capacities of their communities (Tierney, 2015). These observations on the dark side of resilience offer students of leadership and management a good example of how current trends in strategic thinking can also be approached with critical and ethical deliberation.

Contesting Traditional Security Mentalities

Resilience is usually defined as the latent ability of systems, individuals, communities, and organisations to (i) withstand the effects of major disruptions, (ii) maintain one’s ability to act amid a crisis, and (iii) bounce back from a crisis and use the experience to increase one’s adaptability in the future (see Brand & Jax, 2007). As a novel security mentality – as a set of ideas that makes claims about how security is valued and achieved (Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 7)—resilience challenges some of the traditional state-centric security mentalities such as those of defence, protection, and prevention. In the security mentality based on the primacy of defence, the
focus of governance is on safeguarding the territorial integrity and continuity of key societal functions of the nation state (external security). In the case of protection and prevention, the focus of governance is either on social, economic, and political substructures. These correlate with the level of human development or on providing internal security and order through punitive actions, policing and other deterring technologies and practices.

When examined through the logic of defence, the main security threats are usually perceived to be posed by other state actors or other relatively organised collective entities or polities. In the logic of protection, the main threats are perceived to stem from structural distortions such as poverty, inequality, and other cultural practices that cause structural violence. Finally, in the logic of prevention, security policy focuses more on the general welfare of society and its orderliness. Predominant threats are usually perceived to stem from organised illegal activities or specific societal distortions that endanger domestic order and the sense of security, such as the process of political radicalisation.

The security mentality based on resilience, by contrast, emphasises the radical openness and uncertain nature of the threat environment in an age of increasing complexity (Juntunen & Hyvönen, 2014). Thus, the primary objective of resilience politics is not to enhance the robustness of critical infrastructures (e.g. energy networks), nor does resilience politics rely purely on physical technologies of coercion (e.g. military or police forces). Instead, it emphasises the need to increase the mental and physical adaptability of individuals, communities, the private sector, and civil society to face unpredictable, even inevitable threats. Resilience politics aims to enhance the functionality of society. That is, to maintain the core purposes of societies during crises due to the tight coupling of societal functions with the increasing complexity and vulnerability of modern physical infrastructure (Pursiainen, 2018, p. 633).

The main differences between the logics of defence, protection, prevention, and resilience in light of security governance are illustrated in Table 1. These logics are further elaborated through five dimensions: who or what the referent object of security governance is, what kinds of threat perceptions the logic relies on, who the primary security actors (providers of security) are, how the agenda of security policy is
formulated, and how the role of security policy is understood in relation to the normal running of politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENT OBJECT OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE</th>
<th>DOMINANT THREAT PERCEPTIONS</th>
<th>KEY SECURITY AGENTS</th>
<th>SECURITY POLICY AGENDA (STATED OR IMPLICIT)</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND SECURITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Territorial integrity of the state and borders, critical infrastructure and continuity of state functions</td>
<td>Fear and uncertainty caused by other states or otherwise highly organised political actors; conflicts between state actors</td>
<td>Defence forces and other key actors protecting territorial integrity and the continuity of key state functions and internal order</td>
<td>Security issues tend to be separated from other societal processes and normal political order; security as the realm of exceptional; enemy images might prevail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Vulnerable individuals, groups, and communities</td>
<td>Political, economic, and social structures that cause inequality and suffering: global warming, resource scarcity, and deprivation; intrastate ethnic conflicts</td>
<td>Local governments (responsibility to protect), international and nongovernmental actors providing humanitarian assistance and interventions</td>
<td>Explicit ambition to remove the structural sources of insecurity and free the suffering from harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Political, social, and public order and the welfare of society</td>
<td>Organised crime and violent extremism; illegal immigration and human trafficking; terrorism and radicalisation, crime, violence, and disturbances of public order in general</td>
<td>Law enforcement actors such as police, emergency service, and other state actors; also, increasingly, social security actors, private companies, and communities</td>
<td>Inclusive &quot;pacification&quot; of the society through a mixture of welfare policies and crime prevention, including counterterrorism, visible policing, and law enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Processes maintaining the cohesion and everyday functioning of society</td>
<td>Unpredictable nonlinear threats such as environmental hazards and other various &quot;wicked problems&quot;; blurring of external and internal spheres of security</td>
<td>Civil society, local communities, private sector, and eventually also individual citizens; government governing &quot;from a distance&quot;</td>
<td>Unclear: reduces the need to rely on articulated threats and enemy images typical of the logic of defence, but increases securitisation of the societal fabric</td>
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**TABLE 1:** Four logics or mentalities of security policy (see Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2016; Virta, 2013a)
The assumed technological and societal complexity of the so-called “risk society” indicates challenging times for traditional top-down models of security governance, leadership, and management, both within and between sovereign entities. Evans and Reid (2014) even suggest security governance based on resilience is an invitation to learn to live life more dangerously – not safely. The responsibility to provide or increase resilience seems to diffuse to an increasing number of actors or nodes. The role of civil society, private actors, and grassroots movements is on the rise. That said, some scholars claim this has led to the responsibilisation of individuals and communities without a true transition of power or resources to participate in the strategic processes that define the concrete practices and goals of security governance (Glafelter, 2018; Stark & Taylor, 2014; Tierney, 2015). Others emphasise that governance approaches based on resilience have the potential to reverse the old top-down leadership processes and give citizens and communities more agency over their own political and social conditions. Howell (2015, p. 69) aptly sums up this idea:

As a technique of governance, resilience works primarily through an attempt to enhance its targets: a more ambitious aim than responsibilisation. This, I suspect, is true wherever resilience involves a concept of not just “bouncing back” (from disasters, attacks, crises, etc.), but of “bouncing forward”.

This type of understanding conceives of resilience as a strategy to increase the capability of individuals and communities to act in an increasingly autonomous and independent manner without the need to rely excessively on state authorities. This resonates with the idea that security is actualised in various societal nodes, including “organic” nodes of leadership at the grassroots level. This line of thinking acknowledges that the traditional leadership and governance models based on a linear understanding of how events unfold are not sufficient by themselves. The understanding of leadership as a relational concept is also important in light of the actualisation of different resilience strategies.

To sum up, there seems to be rather wide agreement among security scholars that there is no single definition or target of application for resilience politics. They tend to speak about resilience in the plural to
avoid the risk of equating concrete governance practices and strategies performed under the label of resilience to a priori academic definitions of what resilience generally means as a security mentality (see Bourbeau & Ryan, 2017; Dunn Cavelty, Kaufman, & Kristensen, 2015). We suggest the abovementioned distinction of resilience from other security mentalities helps one grasp what resilience is by revealing what it is not, although we acknowledge the security mentalities we suggest above are also partly overlapping ideal types.

Different understandings of resilience as a security mentality have expanded the array of security agents and actors in recent years. This is a challenge to traditional understandings of sovereignty. There seems to be a shift in security governance towards relational leadership models, also discussed in this book. While in the traditional understanding, sovereignty is very much territorialised – even personalised – there is now an increasing focus on guidance, influencing, and other “responsibilising” techniques over traditional models of authority-based control. This provokes the question: Who are the ultimate agents responsible for providing security through resilience? The nodal theory of security provides one fruitful way to approach this.

From State to Nodal Security Governance

A growing school of thought in security studies and criminology centred on the concept of nodal governance also challenges traditional state-centred concepts of security governance (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Security governance is also delivered in the corporate sector, nongovernment organisations, and transnational actors, among others. The recent shift from traditional state-centric security logics (such as territorial defence and maintenance of internal order through policing) towards conceptions emphasising societal resilience has given actorness to local communities, local activism and agile ad hoc coalitions of different organisations from different sectors of the society. As dominant threat perceptions increasingly highlight the significance of global interconnectedness and complex emergent processes, the responsibility for providing security
is scattered from and by the state authorities towards the subjects of insecurity (Methmann & Oels, 2015).

In the nodal governance of security, the state is recognised as only one node among a network of nodes participating in the delivery of security. There is an increasing focus on individual and community level adaptive capacities through different resilience strategies. However, this does not necessarily mean the power of the state or other traditional operators of security politics has diminished. Instead, the various new nodes of security governance are defined as locations of knowledge, capacity, and resources that can be deployed to both authorise and provide governance (Button, 2008, p. 15). In the EU, for example, the most significant nodes in internal and external security governance are the networks of member state representatives (e.g. security intelligence authorities and task forces of police commissioners) as well as the common European institutions (e.g. Europol and Eurojust in The Hague).

The Scandinavian or Nordic model of societal security, encompassing Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, has been characterised by many as consensual, social democratic and welfare-oriented, nonpunitive (a low imprisonment rate), and inclusive (Virta, 2013a). The model covers criminal policy, penal policy, and crime prevention policies. The European model, on the other hand, has its roots in the establishment of the area of freedom, security, and justice in the European Council meeting in Tampere in 1999 (European Council, 1999). Multiannual EU programmes (after Tampere, The Hague Programme 2004, and the Stockholm Programme 2009), together with other European internal security and policing strategies and common policies in home and justice affairs, have established a European internal security field.

This has led to a policy convergence in member states. The European Commission has been an important actor in promoting the harmonisation of crime prevention measures, law enforcement practices, and urban safety policies, as well as in creating a performance regime for monitoring the development in member states (Virta, 2013a). The European model is focused more on internal security, on preventing global common threats (notably terrorism, organised crime, social exclusion, and illegal immigration) and on local-level practices.
Community policing and local-level cooperation is seen as a vital tool for preventing violent radicalisation. Common measures and practices have been adopted and implemented locally. What was earlier seen as a question of national security has now been localised and is also a part of the policy field of urban security.

There are also differences between the general EU and Nordic models. One example can be found from the approaches to critical infrastructure protection. In the Nordic countries, the role of what is today labelled the comprehensive societal resilience approach has traditionally been considered important, as has been the focus on the protection of physical infrastructure and increasing its redundancy. The EU, on the other hand, has traditionally focused on physical infrastructure and only recently started to map security technologies that would merge the protection-centred approach with increasing demands for a more comprehensive societal resilience approach (Pursiainen, 2018, pp. 633–635).

One of the recent key documents based on the security mentality of resilience in the context of the EU’s external relations is the 2016 EUGS entitled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”. Although originally formulated in the context of the EU’s humanitarian and development policy programmes established in the Sahel and eastern regions of Africa in the early 2010s, in the EUGS, resilience appears as a strategic concept – that is, a security mentality. Resilience is mentioned some 40 times in the EUGS. Human security, the concept in vogue when the EU’s last foreign and security policy strategy was drafted in the early 2000s, is only mentioned four times – a clear verbal indication of a paradigm change from protection to resilience. In the EUGS, resilience is defined as the ability of states and societies to reform amid an increasingly complex and unpredictable threat environment (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 23).

Many scholars and key EU officials have noted the central role of resilience in the EUGS is also communicative (Mälksoo, 2016; Tucci, 2016). In other words, it has been applied to the strategy as a reactive conceptual compromise to mitigate the fact the EU lacks effective control over the societal development and security situation in its “near abroad”. The 1990s and early 2000s promise of the EU as a progressive and pacifying
liberal project that would also allow good governance practices to trickle into the societies in its near abroad has not yet materialised. Instead, hot crises, interlinked extra- and intrastate wars as well as the fundamental lack of human security in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe painfully testify to the crisis of the EU as a liberal project, not to mention the EU’s internal challenges and disintegrating propensities. In this light, resilience has been invented as a boundary concept or communication device uniting those who still believe in the optimistic liberal project and its soft power effects with those who favour a more isolationist approach and emphasise the role of power politics and strict control of the EU’s external borders (Cross, 2016).

The EU seems to be more sceptical of its own leadership abilities and readiness to govern the complex threat environment with top-down models now than it was two decades ago. Following the security mentality based on resilience and the dispersion of security agency as the nodal theory of security governance presented above suggests the EU’s approach to reinforce the strengths and resources of local agents, communities, and civil society is the starting point of a decentralised and agile mode of security governance.

On the other hand, it is good to acknowledge that societal security strategies and internal security strategies usually have citizen participation and deliberation as their strategic objectives. They are considered integral elements of systemic comprehensive security, where collaborative, complex, adaptive networks are seen as new forums of citizen engagement. To give a recent example from Finland, deliberative models have been introduced into the areas of societal security and resilience. Citizen engagement and participation has been enhanced through novel practices such as citizen sourcing and citizen juries (Virta & Branders, 2016, p. 1151).

Discussion

In contemporary security parlance, resilience refers to the ability of societies, communities and even individuals to withstand major disruptions or shocks and to maintain one’s functioning – even learning
to be stronger – after adversity. As a strategic concept directing security policy, resilience is a sweeping response to perceptions of increasing complexity posed by the combination of various nonlinear threats and the vulnerability of our postmodern societies and lifestyles.

The rise of resilience politics does not come without possible ethical problems. Some scholars have even claimed the rise of resilience as a dominant security mentality might lead towards a culture of insecurity where policies are guided with the goal of taming the most harmful consequences of insecurity instead of comprehensively providing safety from harm (see Evans & Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013; Methmann & Oels, 2015).

Using the nodal theory of security governance, we have also illustrated the possible implications that the shift from security mentalities such as protection, prevention, and defence to that of resilience poses to the techniques of security governance, agency, and leadership in general. The rise of resilience politics seems to follow the general lines of nodal theory in that the security political actorness continues to disperse among different levels of societal actors. At the same time, the increasing demands of security indicate traditional state-centric security actors are facing severe challenges in terms of security leadership.

The rise of resilience politics and its practical implications indicate a certain lack of leadership and controllability. On the face of it, traditional security authority tends towards multilayered nodes and actors, all the way to communities and individuals. This might lead to positive enhancement of several societal actors in terms of security actorness. But the increasing reliance on resilience also has a dark side. What seems especially daunting is the critique that resilience strategies naturalise complexity-induced insecurity as a permanent state and normalise crises as potentially positive learning experiences enabling one to become stronger and more anti-fragile (see Schmidt, 2015). In some instances, the increasing demand for resilience might decrease incentives for traditional state actors to transform social structures with reforms and preventive policies. It is also appropriate to ask whether resilience approaches rely on a relatively managerial and reactive conception of political subjectivity activated only after the harm has already occurred. As a security mentality, resilience seems to be rather passive in the face
of complex threats stemming from outside and within one’s society (Bourbeau, 2015, pp. 174–177; Juntunen & Hyvönen, 2014).

Finally, in terms of security leadership and management in practice, within the complex contemporary world of old, new, and emerging threats and risks, the terms “security risk management” and “security risk governance” best describe the strategic and operative functions of various networked actors and nodes in doing and delivering security – global networks, states, authorities, civil society assemblages, and people themselves (see Button, 2008). A systemic approach to security entails complex and adaptive security systems and subsystems. The value of the complexity theory derives from its characteristics: interdisciplinary, nondeterministic, systemic, contextual or circumstantial, and chaotic; or at least not entirely predictable and developmental (Pycroft & Bartollas, 2014). Security leadership requires systems intelligence. This means understanding the interconnectedness and interdependency of various phenomena, understanding what complexity is and means, and understanding the contingent, ambiguous, and political nature of security – or rather, securities (Virta & Branders, 2016).

References


